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In the market, the manner in which prices are determined depends 
on the conditions of the market itself. Under perfect competition, large 
numbers of small households and firms determine demand and supply 
which in turn determine the equilibrium prices. A market in which 
supply is established by only one firm with an infinitive number of 
consumers provides knowledge about monopoly price. Between monop-
olistic and perfect competition, there-are several stages of competition 
based on the number of economic agent in the market. Here, we shall 
discuss the situation in which there is a large number of small com-
petitors forming a coalition. 
1. THE CONCEPT OF CORE 
The concept of coalition is developed in n-person game theory 
(n~3), but there are・many unsolved problems in this theory eliminating 
from the fact that every situation is too complicated to build a general 
theory. Several methods of classifying games have been developed. 
The most important one among them is the classification by character-
istic functions; that is, imputations and the core. Here, let us consider 
the real-valued function which has the following properties defining 
tlie characteristics of a general game; that is, 
v(</J)=O where </J denotes the empty set. (1-1) 
If R and S are any two disjoint subsets of players 
v(Ru S)~v(R} + v(S). (1-2) 
It may be shown that in the case of a zero-sum game two addi-
tional conditions must be satisfied. 
v(In)=O, where In is the set of al players. (1-3) 
v(S)=-v(-S), for al subsets S of In. (1-4) 
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If the function satisfies the conditions (1-1) and (1-2), we can call 
it a characteristic function of ge~eral games. Now, we denote by功
the gain of the i-th player. As the result of a coalition, theかthplayer 
will get the most advantageous gain, え;.So, we have 
V({i})~ ふfori EI, か. (1-5) 
Since v([n) represents _the most that the players can obtain from 
the game by forming one grand coalition, it is impossible for~ ふto
iEin 
exceed v([n), so that 
工ふ=V(In)
iE/n 
(1-6) 
andふ alsosatisfies Pareto optimality. Any n-tuple of real numbers 
which meets (1-5) and (1-6) is .called an impution of the game with 
characteristic function v. We can then combine the two cases into one 
condition as the following : 
v(S)弓苔;;for Skin, (1-7) 
The set of n-tuples satisfying condition (1-7) has h1,?en termed the 
core by Gillies.1 
In the following paragraph; we will discuss the exchange market 
from the point of view of the core in which these n-tuples are included 
in any definition of equilibrium. 
2. THE EDGEWORTH MODEL 
As a simple model of an exchange economy, let us consider a 
market in which two consumers have certain initial quantities of two 
different commodities which they bring into the market, and in which 
production does not take place. The first consumer has和 ofthe first 
commodity, え12of the second commodity, and the second consumer 
brings和 ofthe first commodity, 極 ofthe second commodity. In other 
words, the whole of the economy consume和＋和 ofthe first com-
modity and元12十元2of the second ,commodity. From this information 
we can get the well-known Edgeworth box diagram in Fig. 1. Here, 
1, 12, ………are the indifference curves for the first consumer, 1', I: ふ
…・… denotes the curves for the second consumer, and A is the initial 
point where o1x戸和， OiX2=社， 0必'=知， ando必 '=x22.The・curve 
denoted by BC isthe contract curve and the shaded area shows a more 
1 D. B. Gilies. So加 Theoremson n-Person Games. Ph. D. thesis, Department 
of Mathematics, Princeton University, Princeton, 1953. ・ 
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preferable combination of commodities than the initial point A. 
Then any point on DE ispreferable to any other point not on it. 
If the slope of AF isa given price ratio between these commodities, 
F is a perfectly competitive equilibrium point. Edgeworth showed in 
his famous book, Mathematical Psychics, that the greater the number 
of consumers, the shorter will be the distance between D and E, and 
at the limit the, segment DE converges to F as the number of con-
sumers approaches infinity. This is perfect competition. In the following 
paragraph, in order to discuss・this more precisely we shall make 
some assumptlons concerning preferences and the market. 
Suppose that there are n commodities consumed by m consumers, 
andが=lxi1, Xi2, ……X;』/'representsthe quantities of consumption for the 
i-th consumer, i=l, 2, ……, m. Each consumer is assumed to have a 
preference relation ? between vectors. Given any two vectors, がand
y'eitherダ ispreferred to y'(x'~y'), or y'is preferred to x'(が祝），
or neither is preferred to the other. In this last case, we shall also 
say thatがisindifferent to yi and writeが~yi.Whereが isstrictly 
preferred to yi, we denote it by x火yi.We postulate that the preference 
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relation has the following properities : 
(P-1) Irreflexivity: が～が foranyが詞．
(P-2) Transitivity : が?land l?z; impliesがとが．
(P-3) Monotonicity : 咋y• meansがが
(P-4) Insatiatiability : We can find yi for any :,-i such that y;>-が
in the n-dimensional commodity space. 
(P-5) St rong conex1ty : が?Z;orが~z'andy1:?;z1 or v1~z; with 
J'=I=がimplies(t• が十(1-t)yり>-z;for and O>t>l, whf're tis a 
scalar. 
(P-6) Continuity : P= {yりY'?が}and Q= {り i>-y x .,..y'} are closed tets 
for anyが
(P-7) Semi-positivity of the individual consumer's resouces: ダ ~(l
for any i. Ifが=O we can eliminate the r-th consumer from 
the discussion, because he can not exchange any quantities 
of commodities. 
(P-8) If'there is a numerical function u; (が） forが邸， such-that 
約（が）＞約(yりifand only if x;~y', and uば）＝約(yりifand 
only ifが～兄 u;is called a utility index of preference. 
We also assume the following conditions for the market. Let us 
denote by I'the set of al possible coalitions. S~, 
(M-1) In EI'. 
(M-2) A.EI'and BE I'implies A/BE I'. If A and B are two coali-
tions, the set of consumers in coalition A but not in coalition 
B is also a coalition. 
(M-3)A E r and BE r implies that An BE r.
And then, from (P-7) we can easily define the core of an economy, 
that is, "the collection of al allocations of the total supply which 
cannot be blocked by any set S;."2 In other words, the core of an 
economy is the allocation of commodities for which there is no. possi-
bility of coalition, and there will be no advantage for individual con-
sumers to make a coalition to redistribute their initial quantities of 
commodities. 
Let us prove that the Edgeworth equilibrium point F in Fig. 1 is
in the core. Letがdenotethe allocation of commodities when the 
coalition is entered into by the consumers in S;. If P denote the price 
vector, we can get the following inequality; 
2 G. Debreu and H. Scarf, "A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy," 
International Economic Review, Vol. 3. No. 3, 1962, p. 239. 
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P'・ダ；；が・が
whenダとが fromthe _ assumption (P-3). Ifがisstrictly preferable to 
ヽ
が， theinequality must hold, so 
I: p'. が>I: p'. がiEln iEln 
which reduces to the following equation 
工ダ=:EがiEJn iE/n 
because ex post total supply identifies with ex post total demand. This 
implies that the allocation under perfect competition is in the core. 
In the second stage we will treat the situation in which the set 
of lxk consumers are divided into subsets S;, containing the same 
number of consumers (i = 1 2 …• ,l) : that is, the set is divided into l 
subsets according with the preference they have. 
THEOREM 1 
The allocation in the core is the same for al consumers having 
the same type of preferences, and the same vectors of initial resources. 
Proof 
Since I,. is divided into several subsets, S;(i = 1,2, ……/), we can・ 
choose the a-th consumer in S0 and the b-th consumer in Sb according 
to their preference. In these subsets, we assume the allocations after 
exchange are the most unfavorable to the s-th consumer in S0 and the 
t th - consumer m Sb, and write 
（上工石a,_l_:Eふ………… _l_k aES k a.ES 工石a)>-Xs k aES 
and 
(1-I: 叫ェが，…………上k bES k bES I: X,.6 >-X1 _b k bESb) t 
when initial resources are assigned unequally among the consumers in 
the same coalitions. For each commodity, ex post demand and supply 
are always identical, so that the following must hold: 
1 I: (-I: がーゲ =0,iEK k iESi) 
where K= {1, 2, …・・l}. If the a-th and b-th consumer form a coalition 
to assign their initial resources, they can get a better situation (as-
sumption M-3, and P-6), so that an allocation in the core assigns the 
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same commodity bundle to al consumers in the subset S;. 
Q.E.D. 
THEOREM 2 
Perfect competitive allocation in the・core is on the Edgeworth 
equilibrium point. 
Proof 
The result of trading consists of an allocation of the total supply 
こ既 andis therefore described by a collection of non-negative com" 
iEI n 
modity bundles, が.Let Q; be the set of alが＝がー xi,and i+研i>-が，
for each i. In the case of two consumers and two commodities, it can 
be shown in the Edgeworth box diagram, Fig; 2. Since 01 is an open 
convex set, n, the convex hull of the union of il; is also an convex 
set. The non-negative linear combination ofが=I21, 22;"…・2n/ I'E il; 
(i=l, 2……, m) represents 
<t121+a足＋咋23+……＋ら2m
m 
where I; 佑=1,a年 0.
i=l 
z 21
? ??
??
Fig. 2 
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At first, we are going to prove 
晦 J.
we assume O 1s m J, 
〇＝叱Z吐咋Z吐咋Z吐………+anぶ
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We suppose約 (i=l,2. …w) is a positive number, and the least 
integers, which are not larger than k叱， ka2,…, Kら wherek is a given 
k 
number, are denote al, al, ………awk• The value of z1k = (弁）が，z叫
a1 
k(/,2 kが＇=(一）え……，zWk= (一） converge to z1, z2, • …. , zw,where k is 
a2 k aw k 
sufficiently large, so that z1k E凸， z2kE !2, …, z'°kE凸， becauseふ is
an open set. Since 
w w 
工叶zik=k:E約z;=O
i=l =ヽ1
by the assumption, the coalition among consumers among sets !J1, !J2, …，ふ bringsome gain for each. That is inconsistent with the fact 
which the economy is in the core. So, we can reach the conclusion 
o EtJ. 
Q.E.D. 
We can draw a hyperplane through the origin with a normal P, 
such as P'・全0for z E !J, that. is 
P'•z; ~p• ・ゲ． ． 
But the total value of al commodities in terms of p must be 
equal to the value of initial commodities, because in this model produc-
tion does not exist, so 
~p• ・が=~P'. 烈．
iE111 iEln 
Therefore P'・xi=P'・元;for al i E In.This shows the equilibrium 
point must on the buget line through the initial point A in Fig. 2, and 
must be on the boundary of the convex hull of theふ foreach i. 
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